by Drake Shelton

 

The first year of my studies in Christology left me concretely convinced of Clark’s two person theory. I wrote 78 theses why I rejected the hypostatic union as I understood it in the Patristic and Protestant Churches. I entitled it The Resurrection and the Life and it is attached to the bottom of this page. The following is a discourse explaining why I have changed and adopted a one person view according to the definition of person in Vincent Cheung’s Systematic Theology. I have included an explanation of what I now believe and a point-by-point commentary on my original Theses. I have extensive dialogue with those who still hold to Clark’s two person view on the “God’s Hammer”blog. The blog is titled “Putting Words in His Mouth”, http://godshammer.wordpress.com/2010/11/29/putting-words-in-his-mouth/ if the reader wants more detail than what I include here.

 

System of consciousness is then the definition of person. When I was brought to the understanding that both minds think to themselves, “I am the Messiah” this created a difficulty for me because this is a clear indication of a personal union, but how can there be a personal union if there are two persons? Cheung’s definition clears it up for me at least. This is not to say that there are not distinctions between the two sets, there are. This is not to say that the two sets make one set. The two sets personally united makes one SYSTEM of consciousness.

Cheung says,

"Whereas the divine mind has complete control over the human mind, the human mind does not have free access to the divine mind, but it receives special information and capabilities only as granted by the divine mind."

 

I agree with his distinction here but I disagree with another statement he makes: Cheung says "The two natures of Christ subsisting in one person is called the HYPOSTATIC UNION." [pg 142] If Cheung is here referring to the traditional Aristotelian sense of this term "subsisting" he needs to explain how a Scripturalist can believe in a subsistence. This word refers to a relation in Aristotelian philosophy. In Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica Q 29 Article 4, Whether this word "person" signifies relation? he says

 

"To determine the question, we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of "man," and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning of "person" as applied to God. For "person" in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person.

Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above (Q[28], AA[2],3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting...Thus we can say that this signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to expressrelation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word "person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification." [http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4002.htm]

 

On Aquinas' view, the relation is the person. Yet Clark in Thales to Dewey, in the chapter on Aristotle, in the section on Relation denies that primary or secondary substances in Aristotle can be called "relations." I agree that a Scripturalist cannot refer to the union as a relation because our Philosophy rejects that category of Aristotelianism.

 

Other than that I agree with Cheung's definition of person. Some may object, “How is “a system of consciousness” different from a mind?” In some cases nothing. In the case of Christ, system refers to an “integrated whole.” Do two minds thus combine in Jesus to form System of consciousness? I refuse to believe that Jesus was born a human person who after a period of time enters into union with the divine. Jesus is conceived one theanthropic system of consciousness.  Therefore, the union is not accidental in the sense that the human cannot be thought of without union to the Logos. However, the union is not essential in the sense that the union is at the level of hypostasis/infima species not at the level of nature/essence.  This is not to say that there are not distinctions between the two sets, there are. This is not to say that the two sets make one set. The two sets personally united makes one SYSTEM of consciousness. Some will object, "It seems to me that you would have to some overriding ego/self/mind/person to be ruling over this system. But that is just a third man argument, similar to the fourth man argument for the Trinity, which is refuted by the infinite regress result." The overriding ego is called the Logos. There is no third man because there are not two persons but one person. The rational faculty is at the level of nature for the human aspect in Christ here. The human receives a hypostatization in union with the Logos. Normal human persons have their own hypostatizations but the human nature in Christ receives hypostatization in union with the Logos. You cannot think of the human nature outside of union with the Logos. Are the two minds of Jesus two consciousnesses? Yes, but the divine one is the hypostasis for the human. It is not as if the divine nature and hypostasis united to a human nature and hypostasis to create a third set. Therefore, this construction posits two natures in one person.

I can see no way to avoid the Theotokos when union to the human nature imputes to me God's Righteousness it would be inconsistent to say that Mary is not God's Mother because she bears the human nature of Christ. Therefore, Mary is Theotokos.

 

Why I Rejected a Two Person View.

1. Because there are not two Messiahs. There is cleary a personal hypostatic overlap in both minds of Christ and both think to themselves, "I am the Messiah."

2. Because the Covenant of Redemption has two parties not three.

3. Because our direct bridge to God is the human nature of Christ. If the human nature is not personally united tot he Logos it is impossible to become the righteousness of GOD IN HIM. 2 COR 5:21. The obedience of Christ under the Covenant of redemption is the obedience of his entire person. John Owen, in The Doctrine of Justification by Faith Through the Imputation of the Righteousness of Christ (Luckman and Suffield: London, 1797) says on pg. 115-118,

“The obedience…was the obedience OF HIS PERSON…It was performed in the HUMAN NATURE; but it was the person of Christ who performed it. As in the person of a man, some of his acts, as to the immediate principle of operation, are acts of the body, and some are acts of the soul; yet, in their performance, they are the acts of the person: so the acts of Christ, in his mediation, as to their immediate operation, were the actings of his distinct natures; some of the divine, some of the human: but as to the perfecting efficacy of them they were the acts of his whole person:…the Son of God [in the abstract] was never absolutely made under the law, nor could he be formally obliged thereby….who never could be made under the law in his whole person: for the divine nature cannot be subject to an outward work of its own, such as the law is; nor can it have an authoritative power over it, as it must have, if it were under the law...It is granted, that the human nature of Christ, or ‘that which was made of a woman,’ was made under the law, and thereby obediance became necessary to him; but this being by a special dispensation, intimated in the expression of it-he was made under the law; namely, as he was made of a woman; the obedience he yielded thereon, was for us, and not for himself: for, as made under the law, he not only owed obedience to its precepts, but he was made obnoxious to its curse; but surely this was not for himself, but for us.”

Only the human nature of Christ could have been under the law, per se, so if there is no personal union, the human person could not impute to us the Righteousness of God.

 

4. Col 1:15-29 (vs. 22 "body of his flesh", vs. 18 "firstborn from the dead") and Eph 3:9 (By Jesus Christ) refer to the human nature of Christ creating the world.

 

On the Nature of the Union

 

Constantinople 553, The Capitula of the Council VII
"If anyone using the expression, "in two natures," does not confess that our one Lord Jesus Christ has been revealed in the divinity and in the humanity, so as to designate by that expression a difference of the natures of which an ineffable union is unconfusedly made, [a union] in which neither the nature of the Word was changed into that of the flesh, nor that of the flesh into that of the Word, for each remained that it was by nature, the union being hypostatic; but shall take the expression with regard to the mystery of Christ in a sense so as to divide the parties, or recognising the two natures in the only Lord Jesus, God the Word made man, does not content himself with taking in a theoretical manner the difference of the natures which compose him, which difference is not destroyed by the union between them, for one is composed of the two and the two are in one, but shall make use of the number [two] to divide the natures or to make of them Persons properly so called: let him be anathema."

            I believe that the union is not at the level of nature as the Captiula says here but at the level of person. If the union was at the level of nature I can see someone using the term "metaphysical union" but seeing the union is at the level of person/hypostasis/infima species I reject that terminology.  Two distinct metaphysical subjects (denying a metaphysical union at the level of nature) united in one mode or system of consciousness.  This posits no third "I" and no third "nature" because the union is at the level of person not nature so the union is not metaphysical; So in this sense hypostatic. Aquinas says in Summa Theologica Part Three, Incarnation, General, On the Union Itself, Article 2. Whether the union of Incarnate Word took place in the Person?

"to Objection 1. Although in God Nature and Person are not really distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in the nature." [http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4002.htm]

In Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica Part Three, Incarnation, General, On the Union Itself, Article 7 Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created? he says,

“Now, as was said above (I, 13, 7), every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in "I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created.

Reply to Objection 1. This union is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in Him." http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4002.htm

There are many inconsistent statements considering this issue though here are some of the clearest statements regarding the exact nature of the union. If the union is something created and it is not really in God then there is no warrant for The Sixth Ecumenical Council in its Definition of Faith to say,

 

"For as his flesh is called and is the flesh of God the Word, so also the natural will of his flesh is called and IS THE PROPER WILL OF GOD THE WORD, as he himself says: “I came down from heaven, not that I might do mine own will but the will of the Father which sent me!” where he calls his own will the will of his flesh, inasmuch as his flesh was also his own. For as his most holy and immaculate animated flesh was not destroyed because it was deified but continued in its own state and nature...SO ALSO HIS HUMAN WILL, ALTHOUGH DEIFIED, was not suppressed, but was rather preserved according to the saying of Gregory Theologus: “His will [i.e., the Saviour’s] is not contrary to God but altogether deified."

This view would also posit God as two substances and three persons.

Some will object and say that by "metaphysical union" that persons may fall under the science of metaphysics, but it isn't a metaphysical union in so far as it is a mixture of essences. First, the determination of person is an issue of classification. True, classification is used in the science of metaphysics but to attribute it to the hypostasis of Christ falls a bit short. Traditionally "metaphysics" was a science that studied, "being as such." However, the hypostasis of Christ is not a being as such,  it is the mode or subsistence of a being, to put it in the traditional Aristotelian language.  Second, the funny thing is the Church has failed to even tell us what a human person is. Lossky in his “The Theological Notion of the Human Person” Chapter 6 of In the Image and Likeness of God (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press: New York, 1974) said,

 

“To avoid such unconscious confusion, as well as conscious anachronisms— inserting Bergson into the work of St. Gregory of Nyssa or Hegel into the work of St. Maximus the Confessor— we will refrain for the moment from all attempts at finding in these texts the outlines of a developed doctrine (or doctrines) of the human person such as might have arisen in the course of the history of Christian theology. For my part, I must admit that until now I have not found what one might call an elaborated doctrine of the human person in patristic theology, alongside its very precise teaching on divine persons or hypostases.” [pg. 111, http://jbburnett.com/resources/lossky/lossky-person.pdf]

 

I do not want to hear from my Patristic friends when they still criticize me of Nestorianism. They do not have even a leg to stand on.

 

 

So what I am saying is that human actions performed as in a single hypostatic mode with the Logos are not directly to be predicated of the Logos but indirectly. I agree with the new Advent Catholic Encyclopedia,

“St. Sophronius, and after him St. Maximus and St. John Damascene, showed that the two energeia produce three classes of actions, since actions are complex, and some are therefore mingled of the human and the divine.
(1) There are Divine actions exercised by God the Son in common with the Father and the Holy Ghost (e.g. the creation of souls or the conservation of the universe) in which His human nature bears no part whatever, and these cannot be called divino-human, for they are purely Divine. It is true that it is correct to say that a child ruled the universe (by the communicatio idiomatum), but this is a matter of words, and is an accidental, not a formal predication — He who became a child ruled the universe as God, not as a child, and by an activity that is wholly Divine, not divino-human.
(2) There are other Divine actions which the Word Incarnate exercised in and through His human nature, as to raise the dead by a word, to heal the sick by a touch. Here the Divine action is distinguished from the human actions of touching or speaking, though it uses them, but through this close connexion the word theandric is not out of place for the whole complex act, while the Divine action as exercised through the human may be called formally theandric, or divino-human.
(3) Again, there are purely human actions of Christ, such as walking or eating, but these are due to the free human will, acting in response to a motion of the Divine will. These are elicited from a human potentia, but under the direction of the Divine. Therefore they are also called theandric, but in a different sense — they are materially theandric, humano-divine. We have seen therefore that to some of our Lord’s actions the word theandric cannot be applied at all; to some it can be applied in one sense, to others in a different sense. The Lateran Council of 649 anathematized the expression una deivirilis operatio, mia theandrike energeia, by which all the actions divine and human are performed.”
[“Monothelitism and Monothelites”, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10502a.htm

Some may object, “I can hardly make sense of this. All human actions are determined by “a motion of the Divine will.” That is, all human actions are a result of God’s determination.”

But not all human actions are human-divino as in one mode or system of consciousness. Both human and divine operate according to their one messianic consciousness, or messianic mode. This does not mean that the messianic consciousness is another metaphysical subject created from the union of the human and divine minds, it is a hypostatic subject or infima species created from the union of the human and divine minds.

 

All of the actions of Christ are not divino-human (formally theandric) some are human -divino. What that means is that there are three classes of action, divine actions without respect to a human nature (non-theandric), divine actions through a human nature (formally theandric) and then HUMAN ACTIONS moding as a divine person (materially theandric).

So what I am saying is that human actions performed as in a single hypostatic mode with the Logos are not directly to be predicated of the Logos but indirectly.

Classification: Clark said many times that essence is a thing's definition and that is fine; I will go with that definition, but there must be other classifications. Nature can be defined as the necessary predicates for a given genus of a thing. Person/hypostasis/infima species can be defined as a system of consciousness that includes greater connotation and lesser extension than Nature; this has traditionally been called accidents .  

Review of my Paper, “The Resurrection and the Life”

I will now go through every one of my Theses and show if I have changed what I believe about what I said or not. If I have changed I will explain how and why. If I have not changed I will simply give the number of the Theses and write "no change."  I have not changed very much of what I argued against so my theses against the anchoretic Patristic view will mostly not change. Keep in mind that when I am arguing against the hypostatic union in these theses my understanding is the metaphysical union at the level of nature that the Patristic Theology teaches either by admission when they posit one nature or even one incarnate nature in Christ or by inference when they posit a deified human nature in the Godhead; which is insanity.

Theses: 

1. I would agree that the Patristic construction still cannot answer this. Cheung says, "Whereas the divine mind has complete control over the human mind, the human mind does not have free access to the divine mind, but it receives special information and capabilities only as granted by the divine mind." The Scripturalist view squares with these passages just fine.

2. I think Aquinas gives a definition in Summa Theologica Part Three, Incarnation, General, On the Union Itself, especially articles 1,2,3,4,6 and 7; http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4002.htm but it assumes upon Aristotelianism. I am afraid that this view eliminates the position of Sola Scriptura because it gives no inferential information into the reality of a relation. 

3. The only way I could be wrong here is if Turretin gives a distinction in the way he is using substance. In Summa Theologica Part Three, Incarnation, General, On the Union Itself Art. 3 Aquinas says, "Reply to Objection 3. Accident is divided against substance. Now substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in two ways: first, for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis--hence the union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that it is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in the nature." How people are supposed to know when they are using the difference sense I suppose rests on their understanding of Aristotle. Logic and classification can be deduced from the Bible and that I am fine with but this is just ridiculous. Sola Scriptura and Aquinas' view are not compatible.

4. No Change

5. No Change

6. No Change

7.  Aquinas shows that above at #3.

8. The overriding ego is called the Logos. There is no third man because there are not two persons but one person. The rational faculty is at the level of nature for the human aspect in Christ here. The human receives a hypostatization in union with the Logos. Normal human persons have their own hypostatizations but the human nature in Christ receives hypostatization in union with the Logos. You cannot think of the human nature outside of union with the Logos. Are the two minds of Jesus two consciousnesses? Yes but the divine one is the hypostasis for the human. It is not as if the divine nature and hypostasis united to a human nature and hypostasis to create a third set as I have stated numerous times now.  As Lossky admitted, the Patristic view failed to provide understanding of the human person.

9. But not of a rational nature.

10. As Lossky admitted, the Patristic view failed to provide understanding of the human person.

11. No Change

12. No Change

13. No Change

14. No Change

15. No Change

16. No Change, that section needs some editing though.

17. No Change

18. No Change

19. No Change

20. No Change

21. Two minds do not necessarily infer two persons. There is no third man because there are not two persons but one person. The rational faculty is at the level of nature for the human aspect in Christ here. The human receives a hypostatization in union with the Logos. Normal human persons have their own hypostatizations but the human nature in Christ receives hypostatization in union with the Logos. You cannot think of the human nature outside of union with the Logos. Are the two minds of Jesus two consciousnesses? Yes, but the divine one is the hypostasis for the human. It is not as if the divine nature and hypostasis united to a human nature and hypostasis to create a third set as I have stated numerous times now.  As Lossky admitted, the Patristic view failed to provide understanding of the human person.

22. There are two minds but not two persons because the human mind does not have a human hypostasis.

23. No Change

24. No Change

25. No Change

26. No Change

27. No Change

28. No Change

28 b. No Change. This needs editing though. It needs to be #29.

29. This modification is not at the level of nature but at the level of hypostasis and so there is no Arian based change in the Logos here.

30. At the level of nature, yes.

31. No Change

32. I can see no way to avoid the Theotokos when union to the human nature imputes to me God's Righteousness it would be inconsistent to say that Mary is not God's mother because she bears the human nature of Christ. Therefore, Mary is Theotokos.

33. This is an evidence that the Patristic view of the hypostatic union is at the level of nature.

34. No Change

35. The actions of suffering in the atonement, is a human-divino action whereas most other actions of Christ are divino-human. What I mean is that in suffering this is a human action “moding” as the Logos and those actions performed by the human nature can be predicated of the Logos because of the union. I think in Clark’s language it could be said that the union of the two natures creates a theanthropic infima species. This is not a third metaphysical subject because the union is not at the level of nature, or what Clark might call Class.

All of the actions of Christ are not divino-human (formally theandric) some are human -divino. What that means is that there are three classes of action, divine actions without respect to a human nature (non-theandric), divine actions through a human nature (formally theandric) and then HUMAN ACTIONS moding as a divine person (materially theandric).

So what I am saying is that human actions performed as in a single hypostatic mode with the Logos are not directly to be predicated of the Logos but indirectly.

36. If by "generic" is meant that the human nature has no human hypostasis but receives his hypostasis from the Logos, fine, but it need not be understood by "generic" that the human nature is less real than any other human. The rational faculty is the essential property of man's nature as Charles Hodge points out,

"While, therefore, the Scriptures make the original moral perfection of man the most prominent element of that likeness to God in which he was created, it is no less true that they recognize man as a child of God in virtue of his rational nature. He is the image of God, and bears and reflects the divine likeness among the inhabitants of the earth, because he is a spirit, an intelligent, voluntary agent; and as such he is rightfully invested with universal dominion. This is what the Reformed theologians were accustomed to call the essential image of God, as distinguished from the accidental. The one consisting in the very nature of the soul, the other in its accidental endowments, that is, such as might be lost without the loss of humanity itself." Systematic Theology Vol 2 pg. 99

37. No Change

38. No Change

39. No Change

40. No Change

41. No Change

42. No Change

43. No Change

44. The difference is that the rational faculty of the human nature has no human hypostasis but a divine hypostasis. 

45. All of the actions of Christ are not divino-human (formally theandric) some are human -divino. What that means is that there are three classes of action, divine actions without respect to a human nature (non-theandric), divine actions through a human nature (formally theandric) and then HUMAN ACTIONS moding as a divine person (materially theandric). So what I am saying is that human actions performed as in a single hypostatic mode with the Logos are not directly to be predicated of the Logos but indirectly.

46. Soul is at the level of nature not person.

47. The problem is covenantal union in Christ does not explain why union to the human nature imputes to us the Righteousness of God.

48. No Change

49. Turretin, Institutes of Elentic Theology Vol 2, section 13.14

"Now this desertion is not to be conceived as absolute, total and eternal (such as is

felt only by demons and the reprobate), but temporal and relative; not in respect

of the union of nature (for what the Son of God once assumed he never parted

with); or of the union of grace and holiness because he was always blameless

(akakos) and pure (amiantos), endowed with untainted holiness; or of

communion and protection because God was always at his right hand (Psa

110:5), nor was he ever left alone (Jn 16:32). But as to a participation in joy and

felicity, God suspending for a little while the favorable presence of grace and the

influx of consolation and happiness that he might be able to suffer all the

punishment due to us (as to withdrawal of vision, not as to a dissolution of union;

as to the want of the sense of the divine love, intercepted by the sense of the

divine wrath and vengeance resting upon him, not as top a real privation or

extinction of it). And, as the Scholastics say, as to 'the affection of advantage' that

he might be destitute of the ineffable consolation and joy which arises from a

sense of God's paternal love and the beatific vision of his countenance (Ps. 16);

but not as to 'the affection of righteousness' because he felt nothing inordinate in

himself which would tend to desperation, impatience or blasphemy against God.

VII. (4)Christ was made a curse for us (Gal 3:13), while the curse due to us...This

assuredly does not respect only the body, but especially the soul, which can be

affected by such a sense. Not a few papists have acknowledged this; cf.

Maldonatas...Ferus...although he felt the dreadfulness of the torments inflicted

upon him, still was certain of their happy end and his own deliverance). Hence

appears the falsity of the atrocious calumny most unjustly charged by our

opponents upon Calvin-as by Bellarmine (De Christo Anime)...because he says

on Mt. 27:46, "but it is absurd that a voice of despair should escape from

Christ...Now if faith is fixed in his heart, how could despair fall upon him?...With

similar calumny that great man of God is accused of saying that Christ was

'damned' because he says, 'he was constituted in such a damnation' that he

complained of being deserted of God...But:(1) who does not see that 'damnation'

is put here for 'condemnation,' according to the most customary style of the

French language at that time? (2) If Christ is called 'a curse,' why cannot

damnation be ascribed to him? (3) The fathers and some of our opponents have

so spoken: Cyprian, 'He was damned that he might free the damned; he suffered

that he might heal the sick; he feared to make us secure' (De Passione Christi...in

Arnold Carnotensis, Opera, p. 49...Gregory Nazianzus, 'He united that which was

condemned that he might free the whole from condemnation' (Fourth Theological

Oration, Second on the Son' 21[NPNF2, 7:317;PG 36.131];) Athanasius, 'There

was need for the very Judge, who made the decree, to fulfill himself the sentence

in the form of the condemned'(de Incarn.+); Gregory the Great, 'He assumed the

form of a condemned man' and 'condemns him for sinners who is without sin'

(Morals on the Book of Job 3.14* [1844], 1:148-49; PL 75.612-13). The Vulgate

uses the word damnatio as does the Louvain version of the year 1533."

 

50. The union as described by Cheung is coherent and rational.

 

51. On the Aristotelian definition, this is true in some sense but the Reformed view as a whole posits the union at the level of hypostasis, the Patristic view posits a union at the level of nature.

 

52. The Patristic union does but not the Scripturalist neither would Aquinas' construction for he said and I agree in Summa Theologica Part Three, Incarnation, General, On the Union Itself, Article 7 Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created? that the union is not in God,

"Now, as was said above (I, 13, 7), every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in "I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created.

Reply to Objection 1. This union is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in Him." http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4002.htm

 

53. See 35 and 49

54. See 49

55. The hypostatic union at the level of nature, per one incarnate nature, then yes I still agree.

56. See 35

57. The icon argument presupposes a union at the level of nature.

58. The hypostatic union at the level of nature, per one incarnate nature, then yes I still agree.

59. One incarnate nature, per union at the level of nature demands deification, not union at the level of hypostasis.

60. I believe I am in error on this point because either directly or indirectly the Logos is the sole subject, see 35.

61. This is more vindication that the union is at the level of nature.

62. See 2

63. There is need for a hypostatic union in the satisfaction view of the atonement in the Covenant of Redemption because the parties are the Father and the Son (One Person) and in the Imputation of God's Righteousness.

64. I have settled this issue by positing the union at hypostasis and not nature.

65. No change

66. No change

67. No change

68. 99% of the  people in the Reformed community that defend the hypostatic union I have spoken to on the issue posit a Eutychian view and so I posit no change here.

69. No change

70. No change

71. Cheung's modification of a system of consciousness remains consistent and is indeed superior to the Patristic view which failed to define human person.

72. Cheung's view is also rational. The superiority of Cheung's definition is that his view can square with all of scripture, especially 2 Cor 5:21.

73. No change

74. No change

75. Cheung's is also rational.

76. So does mine.

77. Cheung's view is also Antiochene